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1 Introduction
The bankruptcy problem involves the allocation of a single resource in a situation where the
amount available is insuﬃcient to satisfy the claims of all agents simultaneously. This is
very old problem which even appears in the Talmud (e.g., see Dagan, 1994 ).1 The available
quantity of the good to be divided is usually called the estate. The agents are also referred to
as creditors, whereas the term claims is used to describe the agents’ entitlements, demands
or needs, depending upon the problem at hand.
The literature contains many examples of rules that prescribe how the resource should
be allocated among the claimants for every possible bankruptcy problem (e.g. see Thomson,
2007). A solution to a bankruptcy problem is to be interpreted as the application of an
allocation rule that gives a sensible distribution of the estate as a function of the agents’
claims.
Problems of this type arise in many real life situations. The canonical example would
be that of a bankrupt firm that is to be liquidated. A bankruptcy judge is to allocate the
remaining assets E of a bankrupt firm among its creditors, N. Each agent i has credited
ci to the bankrupt firm and now, claims this amount. For example, see O’Neill (1982) and
the following literature. For a detailed review of the extensive literature on taxation and
bankruptcy problems, see Thomson (2003 and 2007).
1The Talmud is a record of rabbinic discussion pertaining to jewish law, ethics, customs, and history. It
is a central text of mainstream judaism.
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Another example would be the division of an estate among several heirs, particularly
when the estate cannot meet all the deceased’s commitments.
Taxation is also a good example of resource allocation problems. A public authority is to
collect an amount E of tax from a society N. Each agent i has income ci. This is a central
and very old problem in public finance. For example, see Edgeworth (1898) and the following
literature. Young (1987) proposes a class of “parametric solutions” to this problem
Many economic situations as discussed with examples above can be modelled as a problem
of how to divide a resource among agents who have claims on it in a single period. However,
for some situations it is necessary to model them as a dynamic bankruptcy problem. Dynamic
bankruptcy problems consider cases where an estate is distributed in several periods and the
agents have claims on the estate for all periods. We study such problems.
In this paper we focus on problems where there are two periods in which an estate is to
be allocated between the two claimants. Agents have claims on the estate both in the first
and the second periods. To motivate the problem, we provide the following examples.
Consider many state universities and several periods for the allocation problem. The state
tries to grant an allowance for those universities. The claims mentioned above are interpreted
as the universities’ claims for their spendings in the given periods. Total endowments for all
periods show the state’s maximum budget to be allocated in all periods. It is reasonable
since in the development plans of countries, they state budget constraints for several years
(e.g., five years development plans in Turkey ). Quite naturally, we consider the case where
the total claims of the universities exceed the government budget for each period.
Another example would be that of allocation of an inheritance. In some cases, the total
asset can consist of diﬀerent kind of goods and commodities in terms of their liquidities.
When those diﬀerent type of assets are allocated in diﬀerent times, the problem turns into a
dynamic bankruptcy problem. For such an example, the numbers of periods is same as the
total number of asset types. All heirs have their claims on all of asset types.
In our problem, we have to allocate the first period endowment and the second period
endowment, namely E1 and E2, respectively, between two agents who have claims in both pe-
riods. Our first contribution is to provide a formulation of these kind of dynamic bankruptcy
problems. We also evaluate some commonly used allocation rules for the static problem in
our dynamic setting. Additionally, we provide new rules that can be applied to the dynamic
bankruptcy setting. The static bankruptcy literature consists of many axioms according to
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which allocation rules are evaluated (e.g. see Thomson, 2007). In this study, we adapt some
of the main axioms used in static bankruptcy literature to the dynamic bankruptcy domain.
We then check the proposed allocation rules with respect to these axioms.
Our first main axiom is Pareto optimality. We characterize Pareto optimal allocations
in the dynamic setting when the agents have linear utilities. The idea here is similar to
the 2-person allocation on the domain of exchange economies. We consider the estate to be
allocated in the first period and the second periods as diﬀerent goods and hence transform
our problem to a classical economy which can be represented with an Edgeworth box.
We then characterize Pareto optimal and strategy-proof allocations. We find that a
strategy-proof and Pareto optimal allocation rule in such a setup must be a member of a
Generalized Dictatorial Family which we introduce.
In Section 2, we present a review of the literature on both the static bankruptcy problems
and the strategy-proofness of solutions on the domain of exchange economies. The model
is presented in Section 3 in detail. In Section 4, we give examples of some well-known
static allocation rules that we adapt for dynamic bankruptcy problems2 and we check if they
satisfy the axioms we defined in Section 2. A special class of rules named Generalized
Dictatorial rules is defined in Section 5. Our two characterization results are presented
in Section 6. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Literature Review
The formalization of static bankruptcy problems were introduced by O’Neill (1982) and
studied later by Aumann and Maschler (1985). O’Neill (1982) suggested that the static
bankruptcy problem could be analyzed by a game-theoretic methodology. He proposed a
formal presentation of the problem and gave an axiomatic treatment of rules that appear in
rabbinical sources. In addition he proposed a method of transforming the static bankrupcty
problem into a transferrable utility (TU) game. By applying the Shapley value to this game,
O’Neill generated a rule that generalizes the Contested Garment principle3 to any n-creditor
2The allocation rules we consider are commonly used allocation rules in the static bankruptcy literature.
Since our problem requires two stage allocation for two periods seperately, we analyze the implications of
those static allocation rules being repeatedly used in each period.
3The Contested Garment principle is provided in the Talmud through examples. A famous Mishna states:
“Two hold a garment; one claims it all, the other claims half. Then one is awarded 34 , the other
1
4 .”
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bankruptcy problem.
Aumann and Maschler (1985) revisited the Contested Garment principle from the Tal-
mud and defined a consistency property for the solutions. Then, they showed that each
bankruptcy problem has a unique consistent solution. They converted the static bankruptcy
problem to a coalitional game by an algorithm called the “coalitional procedure”. They
showed that the consistent solution of a static bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus of the
corresponding coalitional game. In short, they applied the nucleus to the TU game men-
tioned above and generated a new bankruptcy rule. They showed that their rule recommends
the same allocations recommended in Talmud some two thousands years ago to the three
particular cases he considered. Their proposal is now referred to as the Talmudic rule.
Young (1987) analyzes solutions to static taxation problems which are the motivating
example in his paper. However, his results hold for the static bankruptcy problem as well.
He first precisely defines the consistency axiom and parametric tax schedules which are the
form of many historical tax proposals. His first result shows that a continuous, symmetric
method is consistent if and only if it is representable by a parametric tax schedule. Another
result shows the equivalence between consistency and minimizing an additive loss function
in the presence of continuity and symmetry. He also discusses the connection between these
results and Lensberg’s (1983) work in bargaining theory. He shows how the methods of
proofs he developed throughout the paper can be used to construct an objective function for
the Talmudic bankruptcy method.
Chun (1988a) considers why the Proportional solution is the most widely used. To that
purpose, he adopts the axiomatic approach; he suggests a set of axioms which a desirable
solution should satisfy and he shows that the proportional solution is the only solution to
satisfy these axioms. His main axioms are no advantageous reallocation and additivity. A
solution satisfies no advantageous reallocation if no subgroup of claimants ever benefits by
transferring parts of their claims between themselves. A solution satisfies additivity if it
yields the same allocation whether the total estate is divided at once or in several steps.
Chun (1988a) characterizes the class of allocation rules satisfying additivity,continuity on
the estate and the claims and Pareto optimality.
Chun (1988b) introduces a new bargaining solution which is commonly used later: the
Equal Losses rule. This solution equalizes across agents the losses from the ideal point. In the
bankruptcy literature we can interpret the ideal point as claims point. Two characterizations
4
of the solution are presented by formulating axioms specifying how bargaining solutions
should respond to changes in the feasible set and the ideal point. This paper is in bargaining
literature but the rule he suggests in this paper is also used in bankruptcy literature.
Chun (1999) investigates the logical relations between various axioms in the context
of static bankruptcy. Those axioms are: population-monotonicity, resource-monotonicity,
consistency, converse consistency, agreement, and separability. In most axiomatic models,
these axioms are not logically related. However, he shows that they are equivalent on the
class of bankruptcy problems under minor additional requirements.
Dagan (1994) presents axiomatic characterizations of two bankruptcy rules discussed in
the Jewish legal literature; the Constrained Equal Awards rule and the Contested Garment
rule (which is defined only for two-creditor problems). A major property in his characteriza-
tion is independence of irrelevant claims which requires that if an individual claim exceeds
the total to be allocated the excess claim should be considered irrelevant. He shows that
the Constrained Equal Award rule is the unique rule that satisfies independence of irrelevant
claims, composition, and equal treatment. He also shows that The Contested Garment prin-
ciple is the unique two-creditor rule that satisfies self-duality and independence of irrelevant
claims. His last result is that the Contested Garment principle is the unique two-creditor
rule that satisfies v - separability, independence of irrelevant claims and equal treatment.
Thomson (2003) gives a survey of the axiomatic and game-theoretic analyses of static
bankruptcy and taxation problems. This essay is organized as an introduction to the lit-
erature devoted to the formal analysis of such problems. He presents the rules that are
commonly used in practise or discussed in theoretical work. He shows how many can be
obtained by applying solution concepts developed in cooperative game theory for bargain-
ing games and for coalitional games. Thomson formulates properties of rules, first when
the population of agents is fixed, then it may vary, compare the rules on the basis of these
properties, and search for rules satisfying the greatest number of properties together. He
models the resolution of conflicting claims as strategic games, and extends the model to
handle surplus sharing and situations in which the feasible set is specified in utility space.
He identifies well-behaved taxation rules is formally identical to identifying rules to reconcile
conflicting claims, and all of the results he presents can be reinterpreted in that context.
Moulin (2001) also gives a survey on the equitable division of a joint cost or a jointly pro-
duced output among agents with diﬀerent shares or types of output commodities which is a
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central theme of the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility. Another rationing
model Mouling reviews in the survey is the static bankruptcy problem. Moulin’s survey re-
views the normative literature on these two models, and emphasizes their deep structural
link via the additivity axiom for cost sharing. This principle requires that the individual cost
shares depend additively upon the cost function. He explains that an additive cost sharing
method can be written as the integral of a rationing method, and this representation defines
a linear isomorphism between additive cost sharing methods and rationing methods.
Herrero and Villar (2001) provide a comparative analysis of some classical solutions to
bankruptcy problems from an axiomatic viewpoint. They show that there are only three rules
on the bankruptcy domain satisfying equal treatment of equals, scale invariance, composi-
tion, path-independence, and consistency: Constrained Equal Award rule, Constrained Equal
Loses rule, and Proportional rule. They also use the exemption, exclusion, independence
of claims truncation, and composition from minimal rights properties in letter sections and
characterize these three rules and also Talmud rule. All these results illuminate on the kind
of problems for which each solution might be better. They claim that the constrained equal
awards rule seems appropriate for those problems in which individuals are the primary con-
cern, whereas their claims only represent maximal aspirations. The constrained equal-losses
rule is a sensible rationing scheme for those problems in which claims represent real entities
of an absolute nature. The proportional rule lies somewhere in between since it gives priority
neither to smaller nor larger claims. Hence claims and agents are treated on an equal foot.
The only paper regarding dynamic bankruptcy problems by Inarra and Skonhoft (2008).
This paper considers Total Allowable Catch (TAC), as regulating scheme. According to
Inerra and Skonhoft, any overexploited fishery subject to a TAC-regulating scheme in which
claims are based on historical catches can be modeled as a bankruptcy problem. TAC-
regulating scheme, quotas have been introduced in most fisheries. A typical TAC-regulating
scheme implies that in stage one the regulating authority sets a TAC for the actual fish stock
for a given fishing period. In the next stage, the TAC is distributed among, diﬀerent vessel
groups or fisherman who claim to have fishing rights inherited in historical catches. How
the total quota should be distributed among the various harvesters involved is, however,
far from clear as the sum of the claims generally exceeds what is available, that is, the
TAC. Therefore, a bankruptcy problem exists. The TAC in their cases corresponds to total
endowment in each period in this paper.
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In this paper we use a similar dynamic bankruptcy setup as Inarra and Skonhoft (2008)
but there are significant diﬀerences between our works. First of all, Inarra and Skonhoft
does not provide an axiomatic treatment of the dynamic bankruptcy problems. In Inarra
and Skonhoft (2008), the endowment is stochastic and also there is dependence between
the endowments of the first and the second period although in our paper endowments are
deterministic Claims of an individual in diﬀerent periods are also correlated in their paper.
In our setup, endowments to be allocated in two periods are known. In this paper, there is
no dependence between the endowment of the period one and the endowment of the period
two. In Inarra and Skonhoft, first, the allocation of period one is done and after the first
period’s endowment is allocated then the endowment and claims are determined for the
second period by TAC-regulating scheme and quotas. This is not the case in our paper. We
set the endowments and the claims for both period in the beginning. The dynamic allocation
rules we recommend gives the allocation for both of the periods by applying them to the
problem once.
Apart from the bankruptcy literature, there is a huge literature on strategy-proof and
eﬃcient solutions to the allocation problems on the domains of exchange economies. Gib-
bard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) shows that strategy-proofness is a very demanding
property in the sense that it is essentially equivalent to dictatorship on unrestricted domain
of preferences.
Zhou (1991) considers 2-agent exchange economies in which agents have strictly convex
and monotonic preferences. He shows that any strategy-proof and eﬃcient solution on that
domain is dictatorial.
Barberà and Jackson (1995) replace eﬃciency with individual rationality and some minor
auxiliary conditions. On their domain which is the same as Zhou’s (1991), they character-
ize fixed-price trading solutions: agents trade only in certain fixed proportions from their
endowments.
On a domain with two goods and convex, strictly monotonic preferences, Sprumont
(1995) drops eﬃciency and requires a continuity condition with respect to preferences. He
characterizes a class of solutions in which a fixed agent receives his most preferred bundle
from a predetermined set. While these domains are smaller than the one of Gibbard (1973)
and Satterhwaite (1975) they still appear to be rich enough to give strategy-proofness the
strength it has on the unrestricted domain of social choice.
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Schummer (1996) investigates two-agent exchange economies in which agents have ho-
mothetic preferences. Homothetic preferences are commonly used in consumer and producer
theory, international trade theory, and the theory of the aggregation of preferences. Cobb-
Douglass and CES preferences are examples of the homothetic preferences. On that domain,
Schummer shows that any strategy-proof and eﬃcient solution is dictatorial. Schummer
also shows that on the domain of two-agent exchange economies in which agents have lin-
ear, strictly monotonic preferences, any strategy-proof and eﬃcient solution is dictatorial. In
this paper, we reach similar results as Schummer (1996) althought there are important diﬀer-
ences. Schummer uses homothetic preferences while we use linear preferences. The domains
in this paper and in Schummer’s work are quite diﬀerent. We use the dynamic bankruptcy
problem which includes individual claims although Schummer’s domain is 2-agent exchange
economy. The similarity between the two papers comes from the fact that our problems
closely related to classical economies.
3 Model
In this section we formulate the dynamic bankruptcy problem as below.
Let N = {1, 2} be the two agents and let T = {1, 2} be the two periods. For i ∈ N and
t ∈ T, let cti ∈ R+ be the claim of agent i ∈ N at period t ∈ T. In each period t ∈ T , let Et > 0
be the total endowment to be allocated at time t ∈ T . For each agent i ∈ N, let δi ∈ [0, 1]
be the discount factor of agent i ∈ N.We will denote claims as c = (c11, c21, c12, c22) ∈ R4+. For
notational convenience, let ci = [c1i , c
2
i ] ∈ R2+ be the claims of agent i ∈ N in periods 1 and 2
respectively and let ct =
"
ct1
ct2
#
∈ R2+ be the claims of player 1 and 2 respectively in period
t ∈ T . The total endowment vector will be denoted as E = (E1, E2) ∈ R2++. We will denote
the agents’ discount factors as δ = (δ1, δ2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Note that, for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T, cti ≥ 0, Et > 0 and δi ∈ [0, 1]. We will assume that
c11+ c
1
2 ≥ E1 and c21+ c22 ≥ E2. This is a standard assumption in the literature. In almost all
papers on the bankruptcy problem, authors analyze the case where total claims exceed the
endowment is considered. The simple reason is that when the claims add up to a smaller
amount than the estate each agent can get his claim and no interesting allocation problem
arises.
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We will also assume that cti ≤ Et for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T. This assumption simplifies
the model and is valid for all of the rules which satisfy the propery knowns as “truncation
invariance ” in the literature. There are papers which also analyze the case in which there
are some agents whose individual claim exceed the available estate. This assumption states
that scaling down this unfeasible claim to the estate should not aﬀect the outcome. Consider
a bankruptcy problem in which the claim of some individual agent is larger than the estate.
How a rule should treat his demand? One of the principles that appears in the Talmud says
that one should not consider any claim that is larger than the estate. That is, replacing
c by E if c > E should not aﬀect the recommendation. The well-known allocation rules
such as Constrained Equal Awards rule and Talmud rule are truncation invariant although
Proportional rule and Constrained Equal Awards rule are not. It is possible to create a new
truncation invariant rule from a rule which is not truncation invariant.
Definition 1 The triple (c, E, δ) ∈ B is called a dynamic bankruptcy problem where B={(c, E, δ) |
Et > 0, 0 5 cti 5 Et for all i ∈ N, t ∈ T, δ ∈ [0, 1]2 and ct1 + ct2 ≥ Et}
The set of feasible allocations for the problem (c, E, δ) is X(c, E, δ) = {x ∈ R4+ | 0 ≤
xti ≤ cti for all i ∈ N ; t ∈ T and xt1 + xt2 = Et for t ∈ T}.
Definition 2 An allocation rule for dynamic bankruptcy problems is a function F : B→ R4+
such that for all t ∈ T , xt1 + xt2 = Et and for all i ∈ N, t ∈ T, xti ≤ cti, F t1(c, E, δ) +
F t2(c, E, δ) = E
t. We will use F to denote the set of all such rules F.
In this paper we use the utility function of agent i∈ N as Ui(x) = x1i + δix2i . The model
can be extended by defining the utility function of agent i as Ui = ui(x1i ) + δiui(x
2
i ) where
ui(xti) is the utility of agent i∈ N gained in period t∈ T . It can also be extended to more
general preferences such as Cobb-Douglass.
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The above figure illustrates the dynamic bankruptcy problem in the form of Edgeworth
box economy. We consider the endowments of the period 1 and period 2 as diﬀerent goods.
Agents’ claims and feasible set of solutions are also shown in the figure. Linear utilities of
both agents are represented for both agents. For the case δ1 < δ2, the set of Pareto optimal
allocations can also be seen from the figure.
3.1 Axioms
In this section we define some significant properties for the dynamic bankruptcy problems.
We focus on Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, equal treatment and no-envy. There is a
large inventory of axioms that have been used in the literature. However, we just consider
the properties appeared as the most fundamental axioms in the related literature.
Our first axiom is Pareto optimality. Given (c, E, δ) ∈ B an allocation x ∈ X(c, E, δ)
is Pareto optimal if there is no an allocation x
0 ∈ X(c, E, δ) such that for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(x
0
i) ≥ Ui(xi) and there exists j ∈ N such that Uj(x
0
j) > Uj(xj). An allocation is Pareto
optimal if there are no alternative allocations at which one agent can be strictly better oﬀ
while the other agent is not worse.
A rule F ∈ F is Pareto optimal if for all (c, E, δ), F (c, E, δ) is a Pareto optimal allocation.
A Pareto optimal rule gives a Pareto optimal allocation for all the problems (c, E, δ) ∈ B.
Another important property in the standart model is equal treatment of equals. This
property is a weak form of the anonymity property which requires that the identity of agents
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should not matter. Two diﬀerent versions of the equal treatment of equal axiom are defined
below for the dynamic case.
A rule F ∈ F satisfies equal treatment of equals in allocation if for all (c, E, δ) ∈ B such
that c1 = c2 and δ1 = δ2, we have x1 = x2. Equal treatment of equals in allocation axiom is
one of the fairness properties in the literature and simply says that if both agents have the
same claims and discount factors, then their resulting allocations must be the same.
A rule F ∈ F satisfies equal treatment of equals in utility if for all (c, E, δ) ∈ B such that
c1 = c2 and δ1 = δ2, we have U1(x1) = U2(x2). This is the modified version of equal treatment
of equals axiom which says if the both agents have the same claims in both periods and the
same discount factors, then they have to obtain the same utility but not necessarily the same
allocation.
Equal treatment of equals in allocation implies equal treatment of equals in utility but the
reverse is not necessarily true.
Envy-freeness and hierarchical envy-freeness are also examples of the standard fairness
properties in the allocation literature. They can be described for a dynamic bankruptcy
problem as follows;
A rule F ∈ F is envy-free if for all (c, E, δ) ∈ B and i ∈ N, Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(xj). An allocation
rule F is envy-free if each agent prefers his share to the share of another agent.
A rule F ∈ F is hierarchical envy-free if for all (c, E, δ) such that ci = cj, Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(xj),
that is, agent i prefers his share to agent j’s share whenever the condition ci = cj is satisfied.
An allocation rule F satisfies hierarchical no-envy if each agent prefers his share to the share
of another agent with a smaller claim. (e.g., see Kıbrıs, 2003)
A rule F ∈ F is strategy-proof if for all (c, E, δ) ∈ B for all i ∈ N, for all δ0i ∈ [0, 1]
for x = F (c, E, δ) and x
0
= F (c, E, δj, δ
0
i), Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(x
0
i). Strategy-proofness axiom gives
incentives to the agents to make truthful declaration of their discount factors. It says that
an agent cannot get higher utility by declaring his discount factor diﬀerent that what it is.
4 Allocation Rules
The followings are the most common allocation rules in static bankruptcy problems.
In solving bankruptcy problems, the most common practice in most countries is to make
awards proportional to claims. In fact, proportionality has a long documented history as the
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primary method of handling simple allocation problems of the kind considered here. The
Proportional rule allocates the endowment proportional to the characteristic values: for
each i ∈ N, PROi (c, E) = ciS
N cj
E. In the taxation literature, this rule is called a Linear
Tax. The proportional rule satisfies a number of appealing properties.
The Constrained Equal Award rule allocates the endowment equally, subject to no
agent receiving more than his characteristic value: for each i ∈ N, CEAi (c, E) = min {ci, λ}
where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N min {ci, λ} = E. In the single-peaked allocation literature, this
rule is called the Uniform rule, and in the taxation literature, it is called the Leveling Tax.
The Constrained Equal Losses rule equalizes the losses agents incur, subject to no
agent receiving a negative share: for each i ∈ N, CELi (c, E) = max {0, ci − λ} where
λ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N max {0, ci − λ} = E. In the single-peaked allocation literature, this rule
is called the Equal Distance rule,, and in the taxation literature, it is called the Head Tax.
The Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) assigns equal gains until each agent
receives half his characteristic value and then uses the equal losses idea: TAL (c, E) =
CEA
¡
1
2
c,min
©
E, 1
2
P
N ci
ª¢
+ CEL
¡
1
2
c,max
©
0, E − 1
2
P
N ci
ª¢
.
Without a dynamic theory of bankruptcy, the only available option is the use of the
proposals of the rules from the static literature repeatedly in every period. Below we present
and analyze such applications of the above rules to the dynamic setting. As it can be
seen below, those rules provided by applying the same static bankruptcy rules in every
period do not satisfy basic properties we defined in Section 4, although they satisfy them on
static problems. For example, the Proportional rule satisfies the Pareto optimality while the
dynamic rule created by applying the Proportional rule in both periods does not satisfies it.
Now we suggest the following rules for the dynamic bankruptcy problem and check if
they satisfy the axioms we defined in Subsection 3.1 or not.
Definition 3 Proportional rule in both periods. Hence, the allocation is as follows;
In period 1; DPRO11(c, E, δ) =
c11
c11+c
1
2
E1 and DPRO12(c, E, δ) =
c12
c11+c
1
2
E1
In period 2; DPRO21(c, E, δ) =
c21
c21+c
2
2
E2 and DPRO22(c, E, δ) =
c22
c21+c
2
2
E2
The dynamic rule created by applying the Proportional rule in both periods does not
satisfy Pareto optimality. Consider the problem such that claim vector is c = (8, 8, 8, 8) ,
discount factor vector δ = (0.6, 0.8) and endowment vector is E = (10, 10). The resulting
allocation according to dynamic rule defined above is DPRO(c, E, δ) = (5, 5, 5, 5) and the
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resulting utilities are 8 and 9, respectively. However, the allocation x = (7, 2, 3, 8) gives
higher utility to both agents.
It is trivial to see that the dynamic rule created by applying the proportional rule in both
periods satisfies both equal treatment of equals in allocation and in utilities. The rule also
satisfy strategy-proofness since the resulting allocation is independent of discount factors of
the agents.
In order to check envy-freeness consider the following example; c = (5, 5, 10, 10) and
E = (12, 12). Hence, DPRO(c, E) = x = (4, 4, 8, 8). So, envy-freenes is violated in this
example for all δ ∈ [0, 1]2. Hierarchical envy-freeness is satisfied for the dynamic rule since
if ci = cj then xi = xj by definition of the Proportional rule.
Definition 4 Constrained equal award rule in both periods. Hence, the allocation is as
follows;
In period 1 ; DCEA11 = min{c11, λ1} and DCEA12 = min{c12, λ1} such that min{c11, λ1}+
min{c12, λ1} = E1
In period 2; DCEA21 = min{c21, λ2} and DCEA22 = min{c22, λ2} such that min{c21, λ2}+
min{c22, λ1} = E2
The dynamic rule created by applying the Constrained Equal Awards rule in both periods
does not satisfy Pareto optimality either. It can be seen above example in which c =
(8, 8, 8, 8), δ = (0.6, 0.8) and E = (10, 10) since it gives the same allocation as the dynamic
rule defined above.
The dynamic rule satisfies strategy-proofness since it also yields an allocation which is
independent of discount factors. It satisfy both equal treatment of equals in allocation and
in utilities by the definition of CEA.
For the envy-freeness, again, consider the example such that c = (5, 5, 10, 10) and
E = (12, 12). Hence, DCEA(c, E) = (5, 5, 7, 7). So, envy-freeness is not satisfied. By the
definition of CEA rule, hierarchical envy freeness is satisfied for the dynamic rule that uses
the CEA rule in both periods since if ci = cj then xi = xj .
Definition 5 Constrained Equal Losses Rule in both periods. Hence the allocation is as
follows;
In period 1; DCEL11 = max{c11−λ1, 0} and DCEL12 = max{c12−λ1, 0}such that max{c11−
λ1, 0}+max{c12 − λ1, 0} = E1
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In period 2; DCEL21 = max{c21−λ2, 0} and DCEL22 = max{c22−λ2, 0}such that max{c21−
λ2, 0}+max{c22 − λ2, 0} = E2
The dynamic rule created by applying the Constrained Equal Losses rule in both periods
does not satisfy Pareto optimality. It can be seen from the same example given above since
it gives the same allocation as the dynamic rule created by applying Proportional rule in
both periods.
It satisfy strategy-proofnees since it also yields an allocation which is independent of
discount factors. It also satisfy both equal treatment of equals in allocation and in utilities
by the definition of CEL.
Consider the same example used for envy-freeness in the above examples. Let c =
(5, 5, 10, 10) and E = (12, 12). Hence, DCEL(c, E) = (3.5, 3.5, 8.5, 8.5). Hence, envy-freeness
is not satisfies for also for the dynamic rule uses the CEL in both periods. On the other
hand, hierarcical envy-freeness is satisfied by the definition of CEL rule.
Definition 6 Dictatorial Rules
Two dictatorial rules D [1] ,D [2] ∈ F are defined as follows;
D [1] (c, E, δ) =
"
c11 c
2
1
E1 − c11 E2 − c21
#
gives to Player 1 as much as he claims in both
periods.
D [2] (c, E, δ) =
"
E1 − c12 E2 − c22
c12 c
2
2
#
gives to Player 2 as much as he claims in both
periods.
We generalize dictatorial rules as follows;
Definition 7 Generalized Dictatorial Rules
Let define π as follows; π : {(c, E) | E = 0, 0 5 ci 5 E for all i ∈ N, ct1 + ct2 ≥ Et for
all t ∈ T} −→ N. So, π is a function that maps (c, E) to an agent i, that is, π(c, E) ∈ N.
The rule D [π] ∈ F is defined as D [π] (c, E, δ) = D [π(c, E)] (c, E, δ). We call the set D =
{D [π] | π ∈ π} as “Generalized Dictatorial Rules.
Generalized Dictatorial rules satisfy Pareto optimality. Since it gives as much as he
claims to one of the agents and in order to make the other agent better oﬀ, the dictator
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must be made worse oﬀ. Generalized Dictatorial rules also satisfy strategy-proofness since
the resulting allocation is independent of the discount factors of the agents.
It is obvious that Generalized Dictatorial rules do not satisfy equal treatment of equals
both in allocation and utilities. Since those rules favor one of the agent.
To check envy-freeness let us consider the example such that c = (5, 5, 10, 10), δ =
(0.5, 0.5) and E = (12, 12). Suppose that π(c, E) = 2 ∈ N. Hence, the resulting allocation
is D [2] (c, E, δ) = (2, 2, 10, 10). Agents’ utilities are 3 and 15, respectively. Therefore, Gen-
eralized Dictatorial rules do not satisfy envy-freeness. They also do not satisfy hierarchical
envy-freeness since if ci ≥ cj, then it is possible to have a resulting allocation such that
xi < xj.
5 Results
In this section, we will focus on to characterize Pareto optimal and strategy-proof allocation
rules on the domain of dynamic bankruptcy. We first characterize Pareto optimal allocations
on our domain. Then, we combine strategy-proofness with Pareto optimality and search for
the rules which satisy both of them.
Theorem 1 An allocation rule F is Pareto optimal if and only if F satisfies the following;
(i) for each (c, E, δ) ∈ B such that δ ∈ (0, 1]2 if δi < δj then F 1i (c, E, δ) = c1i or
F 2j (c, E, δ) = c
2
j
(ii) for each (c, E, δ) ∈ B such that δ ∈ (0, 1]2 if δi = δj then F (c, E, δ) ∈ X(c, E, δ)
Proof. We first prove for (i)
(⇒) Let x = F (c, E, δ). Suppose that x1i 6= c1i and x2j 6= c2j . For all such allocation x, there
is a suﬃciently small ε > 0 and an allocation x
0 ∈ X(c, E, δ) such that x01i = x1i + δ1+δ22 ,
x
01
j = x
1
j −  δ1+δ22 , x
02
i = x
2
i −  and x
02
j = x
2
j + . The new allocation x
0
makes both of the
players better oﬀ. Thus, x is not Pareto Optimal.
(⇐) Let (c, E, δ) ∈ B such that δi < δj and x = F (c, E, δ).
Case 1: x1i = c
1
i .
If x1i = c
1
i then x
1
j = E
1 − c1i . Then players’ utilities are ui(x) = c1i + δix2i and uj(x) =
E1− c1i + δj(E2− x2i ), respectively. Let y ∈ X(c, E, δ). Suppose y1i + δiy2i > c1i + δix2i . Then,
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δi <
y1i−c1i
x2i−y2i
. Since δi > 0 and y1i − c1i ≤ 0 then x2i − y2i < 0.
uj(y)− uj(x) = (E1 − y1i ) + δj(E2 − y2i )− (E1 − c1i )− δj(E2 − x2i )
= c1i − y1i + δj(x2i − y2i ) < δi(y2i − x2i ) + δj(x2i − y2i )
= (y2i − x2i )(δi − δj) < 0.
So, player j is worse oﬀ.
Now suppose that player j is strictly better oﬀ at the allocation y. So, E1− y1i + δj(E2−
y2i ) > E
1 − c1i + δj(E2 − x2i ) and hence, c1i − y1i < δj(y2i − x2i ). Since δj > 0 and c1i − y1i ≥ 0
then y2i − x2i > 0.
ui(y)− ui(x) = y1i + δiy2i − c1i − δix2i
= y1i − c1i + δi(y2i − x2i ) < δj(x2i − y2i ) + δi(y2i − x2i )
= (y2i − x2i )(δi − δj) < 0.
So, player i worse oﬀ.
Case 2: x2j = c2j .
If x2j = c
2
j , then x
2
i = E
2 − c2j . Then players’ utilities are ui(x) = E1 − x1j + δi(E2 − c2j)
and uj(x) = x1j + δjc
2
j , respectively. Let y ∈ X(c, E, δ). Suppose that y1j + δjy2j > x1j + δjc2j .
Then, x1j − y1j < δj(y2j − c2j).
ui(y)− ui(x) = E1 − y1j + δi(E2 − y2j )− (E1 − x1j)− δi(E2 − c2j)
= x1j − y1j + δi(c2j − y2j ) < δj(y2j − c2j) + δi(c2j − y2j )
= (c2j − y2j )(δ1 − δ2) < 0.
So, player i is worse oﬀ.
Now suppose that player i is strictly better oﬀ at the allocation y. So, E1−y1j+δi(E2−y2j ) >
E1 − x1j + δi(E2 − c2j) and hence, y1j − x1j < δi(c2j − y2j ).
uj(y)− uj(x) = y1j + δjy2j − x1j − δjc2j
= y1j − x1j + δj(y2j − c2j) < δi(c2j − y2j ) + δj(y2j − c2j)
= (c2j − y2j )(δi − δj) < 0.
16
So, player j is worse oﬀ.
Now, we prove for (ii)
(⇒) It is trivial from our assumption on the model that xti ≤ cti for all i ∈ N and for all
t ∈ T.
(⇐) Let F (c, E, δ) = x ∈ X(c, E, δ) and δi = δj. Suppose that x is not Pareto optimal.
Then, there exists an allocation y ∈ X(c, E, δ) such that one agent can be strictly better oﬀ
while the other agent is not worse. Without loss of generality, suppose that Ui(y) > Ui(x).
Therefore, y1i + δiy
2
i > x
1
i + δix
2
i . For the other agent, Uj(y) ≥ Uj(x). Since δi = δj,
E1 − y1i + δi(E2 − y2i ) ≥ E1 − x1i + δi(E2 − x2i )
x1i + δix
2
i ≥ y1i + δiy2i
It is a contradiction. Hence, x ∈ X(c, E, δ) is Pareto optimal.
After now, we consider the allocation rules which are both Pareto optimal and strategy-
proof. First lemma considers two diﬀerent dynamic bankruptcy problems. Only diﬀerence
between those two problems is the discount factors of one agent who has smaller discount
factor in those two problems. Lemma 1 simply states that if the agent who has smaller
discount factor in both problems has diﬀerent discount factors, then, the Pareto optimal and
strategy-proof allocation rules give the same resulting allocation for both problems.
Lemma 1 Let F∈ F be a Pareto optimal and strategy-proof allocation rule and let (c, E, δ),(c, E, δ0) ∈
B be such that δ ∈ (0, 1]2, δj = δ0j, δi < δj and δ
0
i < δj.Then,F (c, E, δ) = F (c, E, δ
0
).
Proof. Let x = F (c, E, δ) and y = F (c, E, δ
0
). Since x is Pareto optimal, by Theorem 1,
either x2j = c
2
j or x
1
i = c
1
i .
Case 1: x2j = c
2
j
Now x =
"
x1i E
2 − c2j
E1 − x1i c2j
#
and y =
"
y1i y
2
i
y1j y
2
j
#
. Since F is a Pareto optimal rule
y1i = c
1
i or y
2
j = c
2
j . By strategy-proofness of F, x
1
i + δix
2
i ≥ y1i + δiy2i . For y to be a Pareto
optimal allocation, y2j = c
2
j . If y
1
i = c
1
i , then player, since c
1
i + δ
0
iy
2
1 > x
1
1 + δi(E
2 − c22) player
i announces his discount factor as δ
0
i rather than δi. Thus, the rule can not be strategy-
proof. Hence, y =
"
y1i E
2 − c2j
E1 − y1i c2j
#
. Again by strategy-proofness, x1i + δi(E
2 − c2j) ≥
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y1i + δi(E
2 − c2j) =⇒ x1i ≥ y1i . Also, y1i + δ
0
i(E
2 − c2j) ≥ x1i + δ
0
i(E
2 − c2j) =⇒ y1i ≥ x1i . Then,
x1i = y
1
i . Hence, x = y.
Case 2: x1i = c
1
i
Now x =
"
c1i x
2
i
E1 − c1i E2 − x2i
#
and y =
"
y1i y
2
i
E1 − y1i E2 − y2i
#
. By Pareto optimality, y1i =
c1i or y
2
j = c
2
j . In both cases, by strategy-proofness, c
1
i+δix
2
i ≥ c1i+δiy2i and c1i+δ
0
iy
2
i ≥ c1i+δ
0
ix
2
i .
Then, x2i = y
2
i . Hence, x = y.
Lemma 2 Let F be a Pareto optimal and strategy-proof allocation rule and let (c, E, δ),(c, E, δ
0
) ∈
B be such that δ ∈ (0, 1]2, δi = δ0i, δi < δj and δi < δ
0
j. Then, F (c, E, δ) = F (c, E, δ
0
).
Note that Lemma 2 is the symmetric case of the Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 can be regarded as a more general version of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. In Lemma
3 there are again two diﬀerent bakruptcy problems in which both agents have diﬀerent
discount factor between those two problems. Only common feature between the two problems
is that the order between the discount factors is preserved. In such a case, the Pareto optimal
and strategy-proof allocation rules yield the same resulting allocation for those two problems.
Lemma 3 Let F be a Pareto optimal and strategy-proof allocation rule and let (c, E, δ),(c, E, δ
0
) ∈
B be such that δ ∈ (0, 1]2, δi < δj and δ0i < δ
0
j. Then, F (c, E, δ) = F (c, E, δ
0
).
Proof. There are several cases to consider;
Case 1: δi < δ
0
i < δj < δ
0
j
By Lemma 1, F (c, E, (δi, δj)) = F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)).Using Lemma 3 yields. F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)) =
F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j)).
Case 2: δi < δ
0
i < δ
0
j < δj
By Lemma 1, F (c, E, (δi, δ
0
j)) = F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j)).Using Lemma 3 yields. F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j)) =
F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)).
Case 3: δi < δj < δ
0
i < δ
0
j
By Lemma 1, F (c, E, (δi, δ
0
j)) = F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j)).Using Lemma 3 yields. F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j)) =
F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)).
Case 4: δ
0
i < δi < δ
0
j < δj
By Lemma 2, F (c, E, (δi, δ
0
j)) = F (c, E, (δi, δj)). Using Lemma 3 yields F (c, E, (δi, δj)) =
F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj))
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Case 5: δ
0
i < δi < δj < δ
0
j
By Lemma 2, F (c, E, (δi, δj)) = F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)). Using Lemma 3 yields F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)) =
F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j))
Case 6: δ
0
i < δ
0
j < δi < δj
By Lemma 2, F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δ
0
j)) = F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)). Using Lemma 3 yields F (c, E, (δ
0
i, δj)) =
F (c, E, (δi, δj))
The following theorem is the main result of this paper. It characterizes the Pareto optimal
and strategy-proof allocation rules. In the domain of dynamic bankruptcy problem a rule is
Pareto optimal and strategy-proﬀ if and only if it is a dictatorial rule.
Theorem 2 If δ ∈ (0, 1]2 the allocation rule F ∈ F is Pareto optimal and strategy-proof if
and only if F is in the Dictatorial Family, F ∈ D.
Proof. (⇒) By the definition of the dictatorial rule and Theorem 1, F is Pareto optimal.
Suppose (c, E) ∈ B. Let π(c, E) = i ∈ N for all (δi, δj) ∈ (0, 1]2. Suppose thatD [i] (c, E, δ) =
x. By the definition of D[i], x = x
0
where x
0
= D[i](c, E, δi, δ
0
j) such that δj 6= δ
0
j. Hence,
dictatorial rules are strategy-proof.
(⇐) Suppose F /∈ D. Assume that δi < δj By Pareto optimality of F let F (c, E, δi, δj) = x
such that x1i = c
1
i or x
2
i = c
2
i . If δi < δ
0
i < δj,by Lemma 1, F (c, E, δ
0
i, δj) = x Suppose that
δi < δ
00
i = δj. Now, all allocations having the same utility with the allocation x is Pareto
optimal and strategy-proof. All z ∈ X such that z1i + δiz2i = x1i + δix2i are Pareto optimal
and strategy proof. Call the allocation z such that z2i = c
2
i or z
1
j = c
1
i as y.
Now suppose that δi < δ
0
j and hence F (c, E, δi, δ
0
j) = x by Lemma 1.If δi < δi < δjthen
F (c, E, δi, δj) = x. Now suppose that δi < δ
0
i < δj then all the allocation having the same
utility with the allocation x is Pareto optimal and strategy proof. All z ∈ X such that
z1i +δ
0
iz
2
i = x
1
i +δ
0
ix
2
i are Pareto optimal. Call the allocation z such that z
2
i = c
2
i or z
1
j = c
1
i as
y. Assume that y 6= y. Suppose that δ0i > δj Then by Lemma 1, F (c, E, δ0i, δj) = y. However,
by Lemma 2, y 6= y. It is a contradiction.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a two-period distribution problem between two agents in which
in both periods, both agents have claims on the endowment of that period. In the first
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section we gave a brief history of the literature on the static bankruptcy problem. In the
static bankruptcy literature, characterization of rules according to some significant axioms
have been made. We characterize some of the allocation rules in the two-period, two-agent
bankruptcy problems according to those axioms. In addition to the bankruptcy literature,
our results are also connected with the literature that looks for strategy-proof and Pareto
optimal solutions to allocation problems on the domain of exchange economies.
One of the most important contributions of this paper is that we construct a model for
the dynamic bankruptcy problem which is introduced by Inarra and Skonhoft (2008). Our
model is an extension of the static bankruptcy problem. Therefore, we borrow some of the
more prominent standard axioms for solutions to the static bankruptcy problems and adopt
them for our model. We redefine them for the dynamic environment.
In this paper we first analyze the well-known allocation rules in the static bankruptcy
literature. We adapt them to our dynamic setting. By applying the same static rule in
all periods of our dynamic problem, we check if these dynamic rules satisfy the axioms we
defined.
We next define a new class of allocation rules for the dynamic problem: Generalized
Dictatorial rules. We also check which of the axioms are satisfied by that new class of rules.
Our first result, Theorem 1, characterizes Pareto optimal allocations for the dynamic
bankruptcy problem. Theorem 1 states that, in a dynamic bankruptcy problem, a Pareto
optimal allocation rule determines awards according to the discount factors of the agents. If
the agents have diﬀerent discount factors, then a Pareto optimal allocation rule fully awards
the agent who has smaller discount factor in the first period and fully awards the agent who
has higher discount factor in the second period. If the agents have the same discount factor
then any allocation in the feasible set is Pareto optimal.
Our last result characterizes Generalized Dictatorial rules which are defined in Section 4.
It states that, in the dynamic setup, a rule is Pareto optimal and strategy-proof if and only
if it is a member of the Generalized Dictatorial rules family. It means that, for each (c, E),
a Pareto optimal and strategy-proof allocation rule determines an agent and then gives him
as much as he claims for all claims δ.
In the paper we just focused on the characterization of the Pareto optimal and strategy-
proof allocation rules. Other characterizations are left for future research. Also we only
consider linear preferences in this work. Non-linear utilities are also left for future research.
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Non-cooperative game theoretic versions of the same problem can also be a good research
question to work on.
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